

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AF-08 ARA-06

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10

NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 HEW-04 AID-05 /132 W

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P R 121500Z AUG 76

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1840

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION NATO

ERDA HQ WASHDC

ERDA GERMANTOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 6494

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM. CCD, US, UR

SUBJECT: CCD - INFORMAL MEETING ON NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
AUGUST 11, 1976

1. SUMMARY. THIRD MEETING OF EXPERTS ON WMD HELD WEDNESDAY
AFTERNOON, AUG 11. NINE SPEAKERS ADDRESSED VARIOUS
ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT. CZECHOSLOVAK AND GDR EXPERTS
SPOKE ON GENETIC ENGINEERING AS POTENTIAL WMD. GDR EXPERTS
FELL BACK FROM HIS CATEGORICAL POSITION AT THE FIRST
EXPERTS MEETING THAT GENETIC ENGINEERING NOT INCLUDED
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UNDER BW CONVENTION, NOW SAYING THAT A QUESTION EXISTED AS

TO WHETHER SOME NEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1971 WERE COVERED UNDER BW CONVENTION. NETHERLANDS REP SAID IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER GENETIC ENGINEERING COVERED UNDER BW CONVENTION, CCD SHOULD TAKE UP DISCUSSION OF MATTER. SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN EXPERTS SPOKE ON CONCEPTS OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS. NEXT MEETING OF EXPERTS THURSDAY MORNING, AUG 12, AFTER PLENARY SESSION. END SUMMARY.

2. CZECHSLOVAK EXPERT FRANEK SPOKE ON GENETIC ENGINEERING AS POTENTIAL WMD. HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT PART OF PROBLEM WAS COVERED BY BW CONVENTION; HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN HAVE CREATED PROBLEMS OF QUALITATIVELY NEW DIMENSIONS. FRANEK EMPHASIZED POSSIBLE LONG-TERM EFFECTS DERIVING FROM USE OF DEVELOPMENTS OF MICROBIOLOGY. HE SAID LONG-TERM EFFECTS HAD BEEN SIDE ISSUE IN NEGOTIATION OF BW CONVENTION. TWO BASIS FOR BW CONVENTION, HE SAID, WERE REPORTS OF SECRETARY GENERAL AND OF WHO ON THIS SUBJECT, NEITHER OF WHICH CONTAINED ANY REFERENCE TO GENETIC ENGINEERING. A WMD AGREEMENT WOULD PREVENT MISUSE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING BY SETTING UP CONTROL MECHANISM. FRANEK NOTED SUGGESTION OF SWEDISH EXPERT AT MEETING AUG 10 THAT A PERIODIC MEETING OF EXPERTS COULD SPECIFY POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONCERN. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, HE SAID, COULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING SUCH MEETINGS.

3. VAN DER KLAUW, NETHERLANDS REP, SAID THAT IDEA BEHIND WMD AGREEMENT IS GOOD ONE, BUT SOVIET APPROACH IS TOO ALL-ENCOMPASSING. HE DID NOT SEE HOW TO COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES IN ONE SINGLE CONVENTION. IN ADDITION, HE DID NOT SEE THAT THERE WERE AT PRESENT ANY NEW CATEGORIES OF WMD---"PRACTICALLY ALL EXAMPLES" OF WMD THAT HAD BEEN CITED WERE COVERED IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS OR UNDER NEGOTIATION. VAN DER KLAUW REJECTED CONTENTION OF THE GDR EXPERT THAT GENETIC ENGINEERING WAS NOT COVERED BY THE BW CONVENTION. IF THERE WERE ANY SHADE OF DOUBT ON THIS POINT, HE WOULD WANT THOROUGH EXAMINATION IN THE CCD. FINALLY, WHILE DUTCH WERE OPEN TO ANY PROPOSAL TO PROHIBIT WEAPONS, HE DID NOT WANT THE CCD TO BE DIVERTED FROM CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESENT TASKS. WAN BATENBURG (THE NETHERLANDS EXPERT) THEN ASKED THE SOVIETS HOW IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GENERATE ENOUGH ENERGY FOR THE USE OF INFRA SOUND OR ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS AS WMD.

4. GENERAL AMADEI, THE ITALIAN EXPERT, NOTED THE DIFFICULTY IN NEGOTIATING CW CONVENTION EVEN THOUGH FIELD WAS WELL KNOWN AND WELL DEFINED. ACCORDINGLY, HE ASKED,

HOW DOES ONE NEGOTIATE SOMETHING NOT DEFINED NOR VERY
PRECISE? AMADEI SAID MANY WEAPONS IN CATEGORIES PROPOSED BY SOVIETS
ARE ALREADY COVERED IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS OR UNDER
NEGOTIATION.

5. KORMANDY, HUNGARIAN ALT. REP, SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DELAY
IN NEGOTIATING WMD AGREEMENT IF NEW WMD WERE TO BE
AVOIDED. STATEMENTS OF EXPERTS HAD DEALT WITH SPECIAL
ASPECTS OF COMPLEX SUBJECT AND ALL WERE USEFUL. MAJOR
SZENTESI, THE HUNGARIAN EXPERT, THEN ADDRESSED SUBJECT
OF NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS. HE STATED THAT A WEAPON
SYSTEM CONSISTED OF THE DESTRUCTIVE ELEMENT, THE DELI-
VERY SYSTEM, AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT. A CHANGE, FOR
EXAMPLE, IN DELIVERY SYSTEM COULD PRODUCE A NEW SYSTEM
OF WMD EVEN THOUGH THE DESTRUCTIVE ELEMENT REMAINED THE
SAME. HE GAVE A NUMBER OF EXAMPLES, IN PARTICULAR OF THE
INCREASE IN ACCURACY OF THE DELIVERY SYSTEM, REFERRING TO
INFRA-RED AND LASER TARGETING. HE THEN SPOKE OF A "COSMIC
TRANSPORT AIRDRAFT" (SPACE SHUTTLE) WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY
BE USED FOR A DELIVERY SYSTEM AND THUS CONSTITUTE A NEW
SYSTEM OF WMD. CONCLUDING, HE NOTED A NEED FOR DEFINI-
TIONS AND SAID SOVIET DOCUMENT HELPS IN APPROACH TO
COMPLEX QUESTIONS.

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P R 121500Z AUG 76

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1841

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 6494

6. SOURIKOV, SOVIET EXPERT, ALSO ADDRESSED NEW WEAPON SYSTEM. THE CHARACTERISTIC CRITERIA FOR TRANSITION FROM A CONVENTIONAL WEAPON TO A WMD WAS TO ACQUIRE ABILITY TO GIVE EFFECTS OF WMD AS NOTED IN SOVIET DOCUMENT. AS AN EXAMPLE HE NOTED THE POTENTIAL USE OF TRANS-URANIC ELEMENTS TO MAKE SMALLER, LIGHTER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH IF ADAPTED FOR USE ON CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS WOULD CONVERT THEM INTO WMD. HOWEVER, USE OF SUCH NEW WEAPONS IN PRESENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD NOT CREATE A NEW SYSTEM OF WMD. THE MISSILE DELIVERY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE PRODUCTS FROM REACTORS WOULD BE A NEW SYSTEM OF WMD. A WEAPONS SYSTEM BASED ON FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVE WOULD BE A NEW SYSTEM OF WMD BECAUSE, HE SAID, THE VOLUME OF THE
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EFFECT AND THE STRENGTH OF THE SHOCK WAVE WOULD BE GREATER AND MORE POWERFUL THAN FROM CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES.

7. JARGALSAIKHAM, MONGOLIAN REP, GAVE A STATEMENT LAUDING THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND APPROACH, AND SOLIDLY SUPPORTING IT.

8. GRINBERG, BULGARIAN ALT. REP, SAID BULGARIANS SUPPORTED SOVIET INITIATIVE FROM BEGINNING AND WERE PLEASED WITH SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGE OF EXPERTS AND EVIDENT GOOD WILL. DISCUSSION HAD BEEN ON SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF OBJECT OF PROHIBITION. GRINBERG WAS IN FAVOR OF SOLVING PROBLEM OF SCOPE BY MEANS OF DEFINITION. THE PROHIBITION SHOULD APPLY TO DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS PRODUCTION, BUT HE NOTED DOUBTS EXPRESSED BY SOME THAT PROHIBITION SHOULD APPLY TO DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE IT COULD POSSIBLY INTERFERE WITH PEACEFUL APPLICATION. THIS, HE CONTENTED, WOULD NOT BE SO AND FAILED TO SEE BASIS FOR DOUBTS ON PROHIBITION OF DEVELOPMENT. GRINBERG THEN TOOK ISSUE WITH THOSE WHO CLAIM THAT 1948 RESOLUTION OF COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS CONSTITUTED ADEQUATE DEFINITION OF WMD. HE CLAIMED LANGUAGE DID NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL DEFINITION AND IN ANY CASE ENVISAGED POSSIBLE NEW WMD. MOREOVER,

THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY. AFTER THIRTY YEARS, GRINBERG SAID, ONE COULD NOT IGNORE DEVELOPMENTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. SUMMING UP, HE SAID THE ORIENTATION OF WORK SHOULD BE TO FORMULATE DEFINITIONS TO ESTABLISH SCOPE OF FUTURE CONVENTION.

9. PROFESSOR BOHME, GDR EXPERT, THEN RESPONDED TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER GENETIC ENGINEERING ENCOMPASSED BY BW. HE BEGAN BY SAYING DIFFERENCES WERE NOT AS BIG AS THEY SEEMED. BOHME AGREED THAT GENETIC MODIFICATION OF EXISTING ORGANISMS FOR USE AS WEAPON WAS PROHIBITED BY BW CONVENTION. IN HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WAS REFERRING TO THE USE OF SYNTHETIC ORGANISMS - VIRUS OR INFECTIOUS DNA MOLECULES - WHICH DO NOT EXIST IN NATURE. THESE DID NOT EXIST IN 1971 AT THE TIME OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE BW CONVENTION. THUS, BOHME MAINTAINED, THERE WAS A QUESTION WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AS TO WHETHER THE

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BW CONVENTION APPLIED TO SUCH AGENTS. CATTO

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING REPORTS, MEETINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 AUG 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: BoyleJA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976GENEVA06494
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760310-0954
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760861/aaaacbfs.tel
Line Count: 247
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: BoyleJA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 NOV 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 NOV 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <03 AUG 2004 by BoyleJA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CCD - INFORMAL MEETING ON NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AUGUST 11, 1976
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, CCD
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006